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We investigate whether meritocracy affects firms’ innovation performance. 
More specifically, we empirically evaluate the prediction that the use of higher 
performance-based pay and promotion should lead to a higher percentage of firm 
revenues coming from innovations in products and services. To test this prediction, we 
employ a survey of 370 Brazilian firms in a broad range of industries. Our two-stage 
regressions, devised to account for potential endogeneity, indicate that while the use of 
performance-based promotion strongly affects innovation, the effect of contingent pay 
is marginal.  Apparently, the long-term feature of promotion-based meritocracy is more 
effective to tap into individuals’ creativity than is short-term pay.  Our study sheds light 
on the debate about how organizational practices can affect the innovative potential of 
firms. 
JEL Classification: O31; M51; M52; J33 




  11  Introduction 
The innovative ability of firms is commonly associated with external factors 
such as technological opportunities and property rights protection, as well as internal 
factors such as firm size, R&D investments, and human capital (Encaoua et al., 2000; 
Scotchmer, 2004). The latter may be of particular concern to firms in emerging 
economies characterized by the scarcity of skilled labor force. A recent report from the 
World Bank, for example, argues that human capital is the missing link between 
innovation and productivity in Brazil (Rodríguez et al., 2008). The role of human 
capital in the literature, however, has been examined mostly with respect to the 
recruiting and selection of qualified labor force.  
Yet, firms are expected to become innovative not only by employing but also by 
rewarding those individuals who effectively contribute to key innovations—e.g. by 
adopting meritocratic systems of compensation that vary according to individual 
performance.  The underlying logic is straightforward.  Without proper compensation 
for the ideas that they generate, individuals may be less inclined to pursue valuable 
innovations; furthermore, skilled individuals who does not receive merit for their 
contributions may leave the firm and even found their own entrepreneurial ventures 
(e.g. Zenger, 1994).  The question we address in this paper, therefore, is whether firms 
can effectively use internal incentives—namely, performance-based pay and 
promotion—to encourage employees to turn their ideas into actual sources of revenue.   
Previous studies have related features of the internal organization to the 
innovative potential of firms (e.g. Hoskisson et al., 1993; Balkin et al., 2000; Davila, 
2003; Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004).  The paper that is closest to ours, however, is 
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myriad human resource practices on innovation and find a marginal positive effect 
performance-based pay.  They, however, do not assess another aspect related to 
meritocracy: performance-based promotion.  Our study contributes to this debate by 
jointly analyzing the impact of both performance-based pay and performance-based 
promotion, thereby allowing for a more complete assessment of the effect of 
meritocracy on innovation. 
Using a survey of 370 Brazilian firms in a broad range of industries, we measure 
the effect of meritocracy on the percentage of firm revenues coming from innovations in 
products and services.  Our two-stage regressions, devised to account for potential 
endogeneity, indicate that while the effect of contingent pay is marginal (as in Laursen 
and Foss, 2003), there is a strong positive effect associated with promotion-based 
incentives.  Apparently, the long-term feature of promotion-based meritocracy is more 
effective to tap into individuals’ creativity than is short-term pay.  In addition, there 
seems to be a threshold above which the use of performance-based promotion is 
insignificant; thus, moderate levels of promotion-based meritocracy apparently suffice 
to yield innovation.  Our study sheds light on the debate about how organizational 
practices can affect the innovative potential of firms, beyond what can be solely attained 
by investments in human capital. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: we first review the relevant 
literature from which we derive our hypotheses. Second, we describe our data and 
methods.  We then present and discuss our findings.  Concluding remarks follow. 
  32  Literature review and hypotheses 
A firm’s capacity to outperform its rivals relies to a large extent on its own 
ability to not only capture value from scarce and inimitable resources (Barney, 1991), 
but also constantly renew and upgrade resources so as to innovate and adapt to complex 
and changing markets (Teece et al., 1997; Wiggins and Ruefli, 2005). Whilst the 
innovation literature has long drawn attention to the environmental conditions that 
affect firms’ innovative behavior (e.g. Encaoua et al., 2000), our knowledge as to the 
internal firm-specific elements that affect innovation is still scant. This is not 
unsurprising since well before research and development activities (R&D) were 
formally organized in firms “societies needed both the ability and the incentive to fund 
it” (Scotchmer, 2004, p.2). As a result scholars have become reasonably familiar with 
the effects of appropriability conditions, technological opportunities, and market 
structure on innovation. But our understanding of the impact of firms’ attributes on 
innovation is limited to size, industrial sector and available resources for innovation (i.e. 
R&D expenses, qualified personnel). Although there are many elements that enhance 
firms’ innovativeness, we focus on organizational issues—namely, the extent to which 
firms adopt mechanisms to incentivize and reward innovative ideas. 
In tandem with the emergence of large corporations, the separation of ownership 
and control was quickly recognized as a challenge (Berle and Means, 1932). Namely, 
the fact that most employees were not owners or the original entrepreneurs who founded 
corporations raised a concern of whether those employees would act in ways that were 
consistent with the objectives of actual owners.  As a result, employees’ behavior was 
soon detected as critical for corporations. Taylor’s Principles of Scientific Management 
was one of the first initiatives to recommend the use of incentives within organizations 
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the implementation of pay for performance scheme as a device to enhance productivity.  
Taylor’s ideas were challenged later on, and are still disputed to date (Morgan, 1986). 
Subsequent discussions on the effects of financial compensation on employees’ 
behavior were developed (e.g. Herzberg et al., 1959; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Vroom, 1964). Vroom’s expectancy theory suggests that individuals have different 
needs and that the attraction they have for an outcome (i.e. valence) will be associated 
to their effort to perform in order to obtain that outcome (Vroom, 1964). Insofar as 
individuals place high value on many contingencies that depend on the availability of 
financial resources, one of the arguments for the use of pay as an incentive mechanism 
is that it can be used to satisfy many needs. Yet, Lawler (1971) observes that pay cannot 
motivate performance unless it is contingent on performance. In turn, Herzberg and 
colleagues (1959) consider that pay is not effective in motivating employees, but is a 
critical element to avoid employees’ dissatisfaction. 
Overall, it is well documented that the interests of employers and employees 
may diverge, and hence the design of mechanisms that induce workers to act upon 
employers’ interest is pivotal. As a result, a body of literature has examined both 
whether individuals respond to incentives and whether firms design contracts that 
anticipate individuals’ behavior (Prendergast, 1999). Principal-agent (or agency) theory 
arose by recognizing that the separation of ownership and control demanded owners 
(principals) to design contracts able to influence agents’ behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976). Despite the observation of Holmstron and Milgron (1991, p.50) that “the 
problem of providing incentives to agents and employees is far more intricate than is 
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agency theory is helpful in identifying both possible sources of friction within 
organizations and efficient ways to mitigate these frictions. Principal-agent models, for 
example, have recognized that incentives play a dual role in encouraging productivity 
and attracting a qualified labor force (Cadsby et al., 2007). Although various difficulties 
constrain firms’ ability to construct high-powered incentives, the prescription of agency 
theory is simple: firms must attract skilled personnel and elicit high effort through 
appropriate compensation schemes (Prendergast, 2002). 
The adoption of performance-based compensation is consistent the notion of 
meritocracy.  In a meritocratic system, “the basic criterion of social organization must 
be the performance of individuals, that is, the set of competencies, efforts, and skills of 
each person” (Barbosa, 1999, p.22). Meritocracy is thus associated with the infusion of 
high-powered incentives within the firm (Williamson, 1985; Zenger and Hesterly, 
1997). Meritocracy should therefore be reflected in at least two organizational features.  
First, based on principal-agent logic, pay should be contingent on performance (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Zenger, 1994; Lazear, 2000). Second, careers must be crafted such 
as to promote and retain only talented individuals. Internal procedures to recognize and 
promote internal talent are consistent with meritocracy (Baker et al., 1998; Brickley et 
al., 2002). 
How would then meritocracy affect innovation?  Following the logic outlined 
above, to foster innovation firms must attract and retain individuals who contribute with 
valuable ideas.  On the one hand, highly skilled individuals will tend to be attracted to 
firms that provide appropriate reward for their innovate effort; otherwise, they will 
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hand, once they are working for particular corporations, individuals will tend put 
emphasis on initiatives that should positively influence their career and their individual 
compensation.  Innovative individuals who perceive that they are not receiving merit for 
their contributions may become dissatisfied and leave.  Therefore, meritocratic systems 
should foster innovation by attracting talented individuals and by eliciting high effort in 
the generation of valuable ideas (Zenger, 1994; Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004).  
This simple claim, however, is not free of controversy. Some observe that 
incentives—especially pay-to-performance schemes—have only a short-term impact by 
inducing temporary compliance, and hence may be deleterious in the long-run (Kohn, 
1993). Others still propose that meritocratic systems only reward few restricted 
individuals, hence failing to benefit the organization as a whole (Appold, 2001).  In 
addition, there is an argument that incentives based upon contingency pay and 
promotion should elicit extrinsic sources of motivation and crowd out intrinsic sources 
of motivation that may be critical for the transfer of tacit knowledge (Osterloh and Frey, 
2000). The latter derives from the notion that individuals derive utility not only from 
what they are paid for but also from other aspects unrelated to wealth creation. Yet 
Murdock (2002) observes that firms may rely on implicit contracts in order to tap into 
individuals’ intrinsic motivation, and hence create incentives towards goal identification 
and achievement.  In any case, the alternative argument that performance-based 
schemes may, contrary to our claim, negatively affect innovation is ultimately a 
proposition that can be confronted with actual data and empirically tested. 
  7Empirical evidence on the impact of incentives on performance has been mixed. 
Fein (1976), for example, observed that firms with formal bonus plans achieved higher 
returns than firms with no formal bonus plan (8.6% vs. 5%, respectively). Pearce, 
Stevenson, and Perry (1985), in turn, detected that the implementation of a 
performance-contingent pay program in five federal government agencies had no 
permanent effect on organizational performance. An experimental investigation carried 
out by Cadsby and collaborators (2007) has demonstrated that pay for performance both 
i) attracts higher-quality employees and ii) motivates employees to exert more effort (as 
compared to fixed wages). Analyses have also been undertaken for top executives and 
have suggested that incentives can be powerful tools for assuring performance 
according to stockholders’ interest (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Even nonprofit 
organizations have adopted performance-based incentives for CEOs. Brickley and van 
Horn (2002), for example, found that in both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals CEOs do 
not have explicit incentives to concentrate on altruistic activities. They detected that 
turnover and pay are strongly related to hospitals’ financial performance, regardless of 
the hospital’s profit orientation. Zajac and Westphal (1994), however, challenge the idea 
that organizations should arbitrarily use incentive compensation because CEOs might 
be risk averse and it might be too costly for principals to make agents bear risk. Zajac 
and Westphal’s analysis of nearly 400 large U.S. corporations furnishes evidence that 
increased monitoring could be used to balance the lack of incentives, in particular for 
more risky firms, although the costs to do so should be accounted for. 
Balkin and Gomez-Mejia (1990) observe that compensation schemes vary 
between corporate and business unit level strategies. The results corroborate initial (e.g. 
Salter, 1973) and more recent (Boyd and Salamin, 2001) thoughts that compensation 
  8systems should match firms’ strategies and that the effectiveness of pay systems is a 
function of firms’ strategic characteristics (Balkin and Gomez-Mejia, 1987). 
Nevertheless, managerial rent-seeking may distort strategy choice, and hence CEOs pay 
may reflect strategic discretion more than compensation for effort (Dow and Raposo, 
2005). However, Wade, O’Reilly, and Pollock (2006) have shown that CEOs are 
concerned not only with self-interest but also with fairness. Their findings indicate that 
CEO over- and underpayment is associated with over- and underpayment of managers 
at lower levels of organizations. The effects of compensation on middle-level managers 
have been studied from other lens as well. For example, based upon a survey of 309 
middle managers, Stroh and collaborators (1996) provide evidence that variable pay is 
offered for managers involved with less predictable tasks and for those in more 
turbulent organizations. The latter is of particular interest to us because the concept of 
turbulence is closely related to innovation.  
As noted before, innovation is conditional upon the creativity of individuals and 
in order to tap into individuals’ talent firms may reward for their contributions. Yet 
incentives that motivate innovation should consider that innovation performance is hard 
to be effectively monitored due to unpredictable outcomes. Thus, agency theory 
advocates that principals and agents should share the risks, and hence agents should 
receive a risk premium (Holmstron, 1989; Aghion and Tirole, 1994). Stroh et al. (1996), 
however, have not found that middle managers receive a risk premium for working in 
more turbulent environments. Their results are consistent with the findings by 
Hoskisson et al. (1993) for managers in multidivisional organizations. The authors 
observed that incentive compensation schemes shift risk to division managers and they 
reduce risk by lowering the level of R&D expenses. These results alone are suggestive 
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that new product development managers respond positively to variable compensation 
based upon project performance. In addition, Balkin, Markman, and Gomez-Mejia 
(2000) have noticed that in high-technology firms CEO pay is more strongly contingent 
on firms’ innovation performance than on firms’ financial performance.  
Laursen and Foss (2003) have also examined the relationship between incentives 
and innovation. Their approach, however, was based on the notion of 
complementarities, that is, doing more of one particular organizational practice 
increases the returns of doing more of other practices (Milgrom and Roberts, 1995). The 
authors surveyed 1884 Danish firms in order to examine whether several human 
resources management practices (HRM) could increase the probability of a firm 
introducing an innovation. Indeed, the authors found evidence consistent with the notion 
of complementarities amongst HRM practices for as two groups of practices emerged 
from their clustering technique and both groups enhanced firms’ likelihood of launching 
an innovation. In addition, the HRM practices alone were hardly able to achieve similar 
results. According to their findings there are just two practices that affect (at 5% 
significance level) the probability that a firm innovates: i) integration of functions and 
ii) firm-internal training; the impact of performance-based pay was positive but only at 
a 10% significance level.  
Their study, however, did not account for promotion, an element that is expected 
to be an important aspect of meritocratic systems.  This is an important shortcoming 
because, as Holmstron and Milgron (1991, p.50) observe, “the range of instruments that 
can be used to control an agent’s performance in one activity is much wider than just 
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do not elucidate how innovative firms become by adopting HRM practices. Thus, our 
contribution in this piece of research will be to examine whether the use of meritocratic 
systems in organizations, namely higher performance-based pay and promotion, impacts 
on the degree of innovativeness.  
Based upon the literature reviewed above, we thus hypothesize the following: 
Hypothesis 1. Firms that adopt meritocratic systems associated with 
higher performance-based pay will be more innovative. 
Hypothesis 2. Firms that adopt meritocratic systems associated with 
higher performance-based promotion will be more innovative. 
3  Data, variables and research method 
3.1  Data 
To test our hypotheses, we employ a survey with 370 firms in Brazil.  
Companies were randomly selected from a database of Brazilian firms published by the 
newspaper Gazeta Mercantil (a renowned periodical of the business press in Brazil).  
After selected and identified, firms were contacted and their managers were interviewed 
by phone.  Since the survey is comprehensive, managers from different functional areas 
were requested to answer some particular questions.  For instance, questions about 
innovation were answered by an executive dealing with technology issues within the 
company; questions about promotion and compensation practices where answered by an 
executive responsible for human resources; and so forth. Our final sample of firms 
covers around 22 sectors or industries in the economy: agriculture and livestock; food, 
beverages and tobacco; trading; retail; construction; car dealing; energy; electronics; 
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chemicals and petrochemicals; cleaning and sanitizing; health; specialized services; 
information technology; logistics; and leather and garment.   
3.2  Variables 
3.2.1  Response variable 
Innovation. To measure the innovativeness of the firm, we asked respondents to 
estimate the percentage of firm revenues in 2006 (the year immediately preceding the 
survey) coming from innovations in products or services carried out from 2003 to 2005.  
This measure, called Innovation, gives us an indication of whether the firm has pursued 
innovations that effectively turned into actual revenues.  An attractive feature of this 
measure is that it is more objective than measures based on agreement scales (e.g., 
Likert); hence, it should be potentially less affected by managers’ subjective judgments 
about what is an effective innovation—i.e., innovation with a sizeable commercial 
impact.  It is also comparable across firms and sectors, given that all firms in our sample 
report revenues that can be potentially impacted by innovation-based efforts.  To be 
sure, some sectors may be more or less prone to such innovative efforts; thus, a firm in a 
mature sector reporting 5% of revenues coming from innovation can be considered 
highly innovative given the slow pace of new product introductions in its own sector.  
As we discuss later, in order to allow for comparisons, we control for such industry-
based effects in our estimates. 
3.2.2  Explanatory variables 
Meritocracy. Following our theoretical discussion, our operationalization of 
meritocracy is based on two organizational features: whether pay and promotion are 
based on individual performance.  Thus, we asked respondents to answer two 
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1.  First, “to what extend the compensation of most people is linked to their 
performance?”  Respondents had to choose among three alternatives: (1) “none”; (2) “to 
some extent to some people;” or (3) “to some extent to several people.”  Our final 
measure of performance-based pay, referred to as Pay, is an ordinal variable with three 
values: low (1), medium (2) and high (3), based on the choice of the respondent.  
In similar vein, to measure performance-based promotion, we relied on 
respondents’ answer to the following question: “Which of the following alternatives 
best reflects how your personnel are promoted?”  The three alternatives were: (1) 
“people are generally promoted based on tenure, subject to satisfactory performance;” 
(2) “people are generally promoted based on tenure, but there is possibility of fast-track 
promotion in case of top performance;” and (3) “people are promoted mainly based on 
their performance and skills, and those with top performance are actively identified.” 
Our final measure of promotion-based pay, referred to as Promotion, is also an ordinal 
variable with three levels: low (1), medium (2) and high (3).  
3.2.3  Control variables 
We adopt a set of control variables, described below, which should influence 
both the adoption of meritocracy and the innovative potential of the firm. 
CEO Age and Company Age.  These variables code, respectively, the age of the 
CEO and the age of the company in the survey.  They are included to control for 
demographic factors that can affect the adoption of organizational practices, both at the 
                                                 
1 These questions derive from the survey instrument used in a research project supported by the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID) and carried out by Basant et al. (2009) who 
investigated firms’ adoption of information and communication technologies (ICT) in Brazil and India. 
This cross-country comparison encompassed the intellectual endeavor of academics from London 
Business School, Institute for Fiscal Studies (UK), Indian Institute of Management (Ahmedabad), and 
Ibmec Sao Paulo (Brazil). 
  13individual (Zenger and Lawrence, 1989) and at the corporate level (Carroll and Hannan, 
2000).  For instance, older CEOs and organizations, with established routines developed 
in the past (Stinchcombe, 1965), may be less inclined to change organizational 
processes and attributes associated with existing products. 
Ln(Revenues).  This variable is used to control for firm size and corresponds to 
the logarithm of the company’s revenues, in 1 000 reais.
2  The literature suggests that 
firm size can affect innovation both directly and indirectly through its effect on the 
choice of meritocracy.  The direct effect is rooted in the idea that larger firms tend to 
have substantial investments in existing technologies and product lines, which would 
otherwise become obsolete if the firm pursue innovations (Foster, 1986; Christensen, 
1997).  Internal groups associated with older technologies and products may actively 
defend existing investments instead of engaging in new projects (Milgrom and Roberts, 
1990).  The indirect effect, in turn, occurs through the choice of internal organization.  
Namely, meritocracy should be more difficult to achieve in larger firms: individual 
performance in large groups is more difficult to meter; some individuals may free-ride 
on new ideas proposed by others; and, even if the firm adopts meritocratic systems, in 
large organizations such meritocracy may be perceived as “unfair” given that 
individuals tend to have biased, inflated perceptions of their own performance and their 
contribution to the firm (Garen, 1985; Zenger, 1994; Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004).  
Consequently, because new ideas will not be aggressively rewarded—at least compared 
to an alternative situation where innovators set up their own (small) firms—the 
incentives to propose new projects will be damped (Baumol et al., 2007). 
                                                 
2 Each real was worth approximately half a dollar by the time of the survey. 
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has a board of directors which “ratifies and monitors the decisions made by executives,” 
and 0 otherwise.  The presence of a formal board is a signal that the firm is concerned 
with internal governance (Jensen, 1998).  Thus, the board may affect decisions to both 
establish internal organizational systems and carry out innovative projects. 
Skills.  The ability to craft complex compensation schemes and evaluate projects 
to improve or radically change products should be dependent on the sophistication of 
the personnel dealing with tactical or strategic issues within the corporation.  We thus 
adopted a proxy for the analytic skills of managers based on their reported use of tools 
to assess investment opportunities.  Respondents indicated whether they used the 
following tools to assess projects: net present value, internal rate of return, payback, 
accounting indexes, simulation techniques, real option analysis, and break-even 
analysis.  For each tool, respondents had to declare whether they used it “as a major tool 
to guide decision-making” (coded 3); “frequently as a supporting tool” (coded 2); 
“sometimes as a supporting tool” (coded 1); or if they did not use the tool at all (coded 
0).  We then created the variable Skills by averaging the responses for all items. 
State-owned and Foreign.  These variables are used to control for differences in 
ownership across firms in the sample.  It is widely discussed, for instance, that state-
owned companies have more difficulty structuring internal promotion and compensation 
systems based on merit because of rigidities in public bureaucracies (Barbosa, 1999).  In 
this sense, State-owned and Foreign are dichotomous variables coded 1 if the company 
is, respectively, state-owned and controlled by foreign entities (e.g., a local subsidiary 
  15of a multinational corporation).  Thus, the baseline category is the set of domestic, 
private firms.     
Industry-specific effects.  We control for industry-specific effects by including in 
our regressions dichotomous variables for each of the 22 industries in our database. 
Table 1 shows summary statistics for all variables in our study (except for the 
industry-specific variables, which are too numerous to report here).  
<<Insert Table 1 around here>> 
3.3  Method 
A straightforward way to test our hypotheses would be to run simple regressions 
where Innovation is the dependent variable and the meritocracy-related measures Pay 
and Promotion are used as independent variables.  Indeed, a visual inspection of the 
relationship among those variables does suggest that performance-based pay and 
promotion are positively associated with the reported percentage of revenues coming 
from innovations (Figure 1).  As usual in research in organization and strategy, 
however, this simple approach may be problematic because the choice of meritocracy 
and innovation is likely endogenous (Hamilton and Nickerson, 2002).  For instance, 
firms may be, at the same time, more innovative and meritocratic not because the latter 
has an effect on the former, but because they have a high proportion of competent 
people—an attribute we did not directly observe and measure—who managed to get 
promoted and rewarded.  Failing to control for endogeneity may lead to biased and 
inconsistent estimates. 
<<Insert Figure 1 around here>> 
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and Olson, 1978; Hamilton and Nickerson, 2002).  In the first stage, we model the 
choice of meritocracy by using Pay and Promotion as dependent variables in distinct 
regressions.  Given the ordinal nature of those variables, we employ the ordered probit 
model (Greene, 2000) in the first stage.  The ordered probit model allows us to examine 
the impact of explanatory variables on the probability that the level of performance-
based pay or promotion will be increasingly high.  The higher the coefficients of the 
explanatory variables, the higher their effect on the intensity of meritocracy chosen by 
the firm.  The model is fitted via maximum likelihood. 
As explanatory variables in the first stage, we include all control variables plus 
an instrumental variable, Authority, which is included in the first stage but omitted in 
the second stage.  Based on a 7-point Likert scale, Authority is simply constructed as an 
average of managers’ agreement with the following statements: “In my organization, 
subordinates need to obey their boss without questioning and should not argue with 
their boss when they disagree with something”; and “In my organization, personal 
influence is chiefly based on the ability and contribution of the individual to the 
organization, instead of functional authority” (reverse scored).  To show effective 
results and get properly compensated, individuals must some degree of autonomy to 
pursue certain types of actions.  An increase in vertical authority should precisely curtail 
autonomy and, consequently, reduce the effectiveness of meritocratic schemes (Brickley 
et al., 2002).  Thus, we expect that Authority should be negatively correlated with the 
intensity of performance-based pay and promotion.   
  17In the second stage, where Innovation is the dependent variable, we use as 
explanatory variables the predicted values obtained in the first stage of our regressions, 
plus all the controls.  We employ the predicted probabilities associated with two 
particular levels of the Pay and Performance variables: medium and high.  Therefore, 
the baseline category (not included in the regressions, to avoid multicolinearity) is the 
lowest level of performance-based promotion and pay.  Thus, Pay – Medium and Pay – 
High are, respectively, the predicted probabilities (obtained from the first stage) that the 
firm will exhibit medium and high levels of performance-based pay.  Likewise, 
Promotion – Medium and Promotion – High are, respectively, the predicted 
probabilities that the firm will exhibit medium and high levels of performance-based 
promotion.  This procedure allows us to capture possible nonlinear effects of the effect 
of meritocracy on innovation depending on each predicted level of pay and promotion 
(for an application of this procedure in another empirical context, see Maskey et al., 
2006).  The second-stage regression is estimated via ordinary least squares (OLS).
3   
In both the first- and second-stage regressions, the estimation method employs 
the Huber-White estimator to compute standard errors.  This procedure generates robust 
estimates that control for potential heteroscedasticity in the data.   
4  Results and discussion 
4.1  First stage: choice of performance-based pay and promotion 
Columns (1a) and (1b) show the results of the ordered probit regressions (first 
stage).  The coefficient of instrumental variable Authority is negative and highly 
                                                 
3 A caveat is that, in the second stage, the dependent variable (i.e., Innovation) has clear upper and lower 
bounds (from 0 to 1), thus potentially violating the assumption of normality of the error term.  To check 
the robustness of our results, we fitted Tobit regressions to our data, which accommodate such bounds.  
The inference about the variables was, however, fairly similar to the OLS procedure (results not reported 
here, but available upon request).     
  18significant (p < .01): an increase in perceive vertical authority—and, hence, a reduction 
in perceived autonomy—is negatively associated with the choice of both performance-
based pay and promotion.
4  This result supports the idea that a low propensity of top 
management to decentralize decisions dampens the benefit to adopt meritocratic 
systems.   
<<Insert Table 2 around here>> 
The other variables show varying effects depending on the type of choice (i.e., 
Pay or Promotion).  The decision to adopt performance-based pay (column (1a)) is 
positively affected by both the presence of a board of directors (Board) and the level of 
skills to analyze investment opportunities (Skills): the coefficients of those variables are 
highly significant (p < .01).  In our sample, firms with improved governance (i.e., firms 
with at least an active board of directors) and firms adopting more sophisticated 
analytical techniques are also more likely to adopt performance-based pay.  These 
variables, however, do not significantly explain the choice of performance-based 
promotion (column (1b)).  Such choice is better explained by the ownership form of the 
firm; namely, as evidenced by the coefficient of State-owned, meritocratic promotion 
schemes are less likely observed in firms controlled by the government (p < .05).  This 
result is aligned with the expectation that state-owned firms suffer higher bureaucratic 
constraints to adopt performance-based promotion.  Finally, the coefficient of CEO Age 
is positively significant in column (1b): firms with older CEOs are more likely to adopt 
performance-based promotion.  However, the level of significance is marginal (p < .10).    
                                                 
4 Furthermore, as is appropriate in an instrumental variable, Authority is insignificantly correlated with 
Innovation when added in the second-stage regression. 
  194.2  Second stage: effect on innovation 
The last three columns of Table 2 report OLS estimates of the effect of 
meritocracy on innovation, where the predicted values (obtained in the first stage) of 
performance-based pay only (2a), performance-based promotion only (2b), and both 
performance-based pay and performance (2c) are included in the regressions.  Results 
provide only marginal support for Hypothesis 1: according to the estimates reported in 
column (2a), firms with the highest level of performance-based pay (Pay – High) are 
slightly more innovative than other firms (p < .10).  However, this effect becomes 
insignificant when the performance-based promotion variables are included (column 
(2c)).  Our results for performance-based pay are in line with the findings of Laursen 
and Foss (2003), who observed a marginal role of contingent pay.  
The effect of the promotion variables, on the other hand, is highly significant: 
firms with moderate (Promotion – Medium) and high (Promotion – High) levels of 
performance-based promotion are more innovative than other firms (p < .01), even 
when the performance-based pay variables are included in the regression.  Although the 
coefficient of Promotion – Medium is larger than the coefficient of Promotion – High, 
the difference between the coefficients is significant (p < .05) only in the model without 
the pay-related variables (column (2b)).  In sum, having a high level of promotion-
related meritocracy apparently does not provide gains in innovation beyond what is 
obtained with a moderate level.  However, results do indicate that an increase in the 
level of promotion-related meritocracy—from low to at least medium—increase the 
percentage of corporate revenues coming from innovations, thus supporting Hypothesis 
2. 
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compensation on innovation. We, however, test whether a more encompassing 
compensation scheme impacts on firms’ innovation performance. Although our pay-
related results confirm existing evidence (e.g. Laursen and Foss, 2003), our results shed 
new light on the effects of organizational incentives on firms’ innovativeness.  
Following Holmstrom and Milgron’s (1991) advice to consider a broader range of 
incentive mechanisms than just performance-based pay, we find that performance-based 
promotion is pivotal to foster innovation.   
A possible explanation is that promotion-based incentives are associated with a 
long-term horizon that is more appropriate to compensate individuals for their 
innovations.  Although the cycle between the generation of an idea and its commercial 
exploitation has been shortened (Nault and Vandenbosch, 1996), it takes a little longer 
for a firm to fully realize the returns it will accrue from its innovations. Thus, 
meritocratic systems based on promotion for those who effectively contribute to new 
ideas may be effective because the actual promotion can occur after the idea is 
generated, executed and commercially tested. This long-term perspective of the 
innovation process is consistent with the recent study of Lerner and Wulf (2006) who 
investigated the effects of high powered incentives on corporate R&D heads’ behavior, 
and detected that more long-term incentives are associated with more heavily cited 
patents. 
By contrast, performance-based pay may be purely short-term (e.g. profit 
sharing or bonuses based on yearly revenue goals); aiming at increasing their short-term 
compensation, individuals may eventually devote less attention to valuable ideas that 
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results indicate that critics of performance-based incentives (e.g. Osterloh and Frey, 
2000) are, at best, partially right: while incentives based on contingent pay appear to 
marginally affect innovation, the role of promotion-based incentives can be profound. 
Some additional results involving the control variables are worth noticing.  The 
effects of CEO Age and Company Age are significant across all model specifications    
(p < .05): younger firms and firms with younger CEOs are more likely to be innovative.  
This finding is intuitive, as older CEOs and older firms may be more committed to 
routines and processes developed in the past, and thus less willing to pursue innovative 
projects that would otherwise create new configurations.   
Aligned with expectations, an increase in firm size (Ln(Revenues)) is negatively 
associated with innovation, although only moderately so (p < .10) in regressions (2b) 
and (2c).  This finding provides moderate support for the conjecture, discussed earlier, 
of a direct negative effect of firm size on innovation due to increased commitment to 
past technologies and processes in large firms.  However, contrary to previous findings 
(e.g. Zenger and Lazzarini, 2004), the indirect effect of firm size on innovation—
through the choice of meritocracy—is not supported, given the insignificant effect of 
Ln(Revenues) on the choice of Pay and Promotion (columns (1a) and (1b)).   
Results from models (2a) to (2c) also show that Board significantly explains 
innovation: firms with an established board of directors are apparently more innovative 
(p < .05).  Skills, in turn, is moderately significant in column (2b) and significant in 
column (2c): firms with superior analytic skills to judge new investment opportunities 
are more innovative.  Collectively, these results suggest that an increase in governance 
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innovation.  A tentative explanation is that these two factors may partially capture the 
quality of corporate management, which in turn may be associated with superior 
competencies to identify new opportunities and turn them into commercial products.  
Even though there is also a positive effect of Board and Skills on the choice of 
performance-based pay, the effect of this choice on innovation is weak.  Thus, there is 
no strong evidence of an indirect effect of Board and Skills on innovation via their 
effect on the choice of meritocracy 
5  Concluding remarks 
Our results indicate that organizational choices—namely, mechanisms to signal 
and reward merit—matter when it comes to promoting innovation.  More specifically, 
we unveil the distinct effects of performance-based pay and promotion on the ability of 
firms to turn ideas into actual sources of revenue.  In line with previous work (e.g. 
Laursen and Foss, 2003), we find that contingent pay marginally influence innovation; 
however, we find that the effect of performance-based promotion—i.e. whether firms 
promote individuals who excel in the organization—is highly significant.  Moreover, 
our results indicate that moderate levels of performance-based promotion suffice: there 
seems to be a threshold above which the use of performance-based promotion does not 
further improve innovativeness.  
Our study contributes to both theory and practice.  We show that, beyond the 
usual recommendations (e.g. investments in R&D, protection of property rights, 
training, etc.), firms interested in spurring innovation should also pay attention to 
organizational practices that can elicit effort towards the generation of new ideas.  We 
  23show that the effect of implementing performance-based promotion schemes can be 
effective in that sense.  As for theory, the findings reinforce the notion that the provision 
of organizational incentives is an important element to make firms more innovative.  
Our results, however, suggest that scholars should pay attention to incentive 
mechanisms that go beyond pay-to-performance schemes.  Apparently, incentives with 
a long-term nature, such as performance-based promotion, are particularly relevant.  
Thus, developing more refined theoretical models that careful discern the differential 
effects of alternative incentive mechanisms on firms’ innovativeness is warranted. 
We would like, however, to point out some important limitations of our study.  
We do not examine whether the adoption of incentives vary according to the innovative 
orientation of the firm, namely if firms tend to promote incremental innovation in 
existing technologies or processes, or innovations with a more radical nature.  The 
effect of meritocracy may vary depending on the type of innovation that the firm is 
pursuing.  Moreover, although we measure whether innovations effectively turn into 
revenues, we do no assess the quality or the sustainability of the innovation created by 
firms that use incentive schemes. For instance, employees may be tempted to pursue 
new product introductions that have a momentary effect on sales, but that are easily 
imitated by rivals in the long run.  Finally, as is usual in most survey-based research, 
measures for the relevant variables are proxies that can be subject to criticism.  The use 
of broader indicators of innovation and organizational patterns can circumvent such 
limitation.   For instance, one can assess innovation not only based on self-reported 
measures but also with some externally observed indicators such as number of patents, 
product turnover, and so on. 
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  28Table 1 
Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  10 11
1. Innovation  1         
2. Pay  0.15  1        
3. Promotion  0.07 0.22  1        
4. CEO Age  -0.06 0.06 0.10 1      
5. Company Age  -0.16 0.05 0.02 0.26 1    
6. Ln(Revenues)  -0.06 0.04 0.15 0.16 0.24 1        
7. Board  0.11 0.08 0.13 -0.05 0.03 0.17 1      
8. Skills  0.15 0.17 0.10 0.05 0.15 0.25 0.08 1     
9. State-owned  -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 0.06 -0.01 0.08 0.13 -0.05  1   
10. Foreign  -0.01 -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.01 -0.13 0.10 -0.12 -0.17  1
11. Authority  -0.08 -0.22 -0.21 0.05 -0.13 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05  0.02 -0.07 1
Mean  0.14 2.30 2.56 52.02 31.69 9.69 0.64 1.20 0.07 0.29 1.71
Standard  deviation  0.18 0.72 0.64 10.92 23.81 2.27 0.48 0.65 0.25 0.45 1.21
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Two-stage estimation of the effect of meritocracy (performance-contingent pay and 






(1a) (1b)  (2a)  (2b) (2c) 
Pay - Medium 
 
 
   0.318 
(0.203)
     0.021 
(0.163)
 
Pay - High   
 
   0.221 
(0.113)
†     -0.244 
(0.165)
 































































































**      
R
2/pseudo R
2 0.12  0.11 0.29 0.32    0.32
N  305 300 209 209    209
Notes 
a Ordered Probit estimates 
b OLS estimates.  Robust (Huber-White) random errors in parenthesis.  All models 
include industry-specific dummy variables.  The second-stage regressions – (2a), (2b) and (2c) – include the 
predicted values of the Pay and Promotion variables obtained in the first-stage – (1a) and (1b). 
** p <.01  * p <.05  † p <.10.   
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Fig. 1. Percentage of revenues coming from innovations reported by a sample of 
Brazilian firms, according to different levels of meritocracy (performance-based pay 
and performance-based promotion) 
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